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Abstract This paper determines the value of asset tradeability in an option pricing
framework. In our model, tradeability is valuable since it allows investors to exploit
temporary mispricings of stocks. The model delivers several novel insights on the
value of tradeability: The value of tradeability is the larger, the higher the pricing
efficiency of the market is. Uncertainty increases the value of tradeability, no matter
whether the uncertainty results from noise trading or from new information about the
fundamental value of the stock. The value of tradeability is the larger, the longer the
illiquid stock cannot be traded and the more trading dates the liquid stock offers.
Keywords Tradeability · Liquidity · Option pricing
JEL Classification G13
1 Introduction
The recent financial crisis has highlighted the importance of asset liquidity for inves-
tors. For many assets the costs of trading were enormous, and some assets could not
be traded at all for several months. But even in less turbulent times, asset liquidity is
highly relevant for investors: “Investors want three things from the markets: liquidity,
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liquidity, and liquidity.”1 Therefore, it comes as no surprise that investors demand a
price discount for illiquid assets. A vast body of empirical literature documents such
a price discount with Amihud and Mendelson (1986, 1989) being the seminal papers.
Most theoretical models capture the illiquidity of an asset by the costs associated
with trading the asset. Examples include the general equilibrium models of Amihud
and Mendelson (1986), Vayanos (1998), and Acharya and Pedersen (2005).2 In these
models price discounts compensate investors for the higher trading costs of less liquid
stocks. In a similar way, the partial equilibrium models of Kempf and Uhrig-Homburg
(2000) and Grinblatt (2002) assume that the liquid asset provides a continuous addi-
tional cash flow as compared to the illiquid one. Therefore, the illiquid asset trades
at a discount. None of these papers looks at the impact of non-tradeability on asset
prices, the focus of our paper.
Temporary non-tradeability is an important issue for investors since many assets
cannot always be traded. For example, many small stocks are traded only once a day
during a batch auction. There are lock-up periods for company insiders after an IPO
to avoid flooding the market with their shares. CEOs are often compensated by shares
of the company, but not allowed to sell the stocks for a while to make the incentives
long-term. Restricted stocks, i.e. privately placed stocks issued by companies under
SEC’s Rule 144, cannot be sold by the investors within two years after purchase. In
other asset classes like private equity and venture capital trading restrictions are often
even more severe and the non-trading periods longer. As these examples show, tem-
porary non-tradeability is a frequently observed phenomenon which can have strong
price implications. For example, Silber (1991) reports that restricted stocks trade at a
discount of 33%. Brenner et al. (2001) find that nontradable options are priced about
21% less than the exchange-traded options.
Given the importance of temporary non-tradeability, surprisingly little theoretical
work is done on the impact of non-tradeability on asset prices. A possible reason is that
investors do not care about trading in most asset pricing models. But if investors do
not care about trading, tradeability has no value for them. As Longstaff (2009) points
out, the key challenge is to model the incentive to trade. In the pioneer work, the
partial equilibrium model of Longstaff (1995), the incentive to trade comes from the
(obviously unrealistic) assumption that the investor has perfect foresight with respect
to future prices and, therefore, knows when the price is most favorable. Consequently,
she can trade at a better price when the asset is liquid (i.e. can be traded continuously)
as compared to the case in which the asset is illiquid (i.e. cannot be traded for some
time). Therefore, the illiquid asset trades at a discount as compared to the otherwise
identical liquid one. Longstaff (1995) adopts the model to determine the price dis-
count for an illiquid stock and Koziol and Sauerbier (2007) modify the approach
to analyze the price discount of illiquid bonds. Both models show that the value of
tradeability increases with the length of the non-trading period and the volatility of the
asset price. Longstaff (2009) gives up the assumption of perfect foresight and develops
a model where the incentive to trade results from the heterogeneity of the investors
1 Handa and Schwartz (1996, p. 44).
2 Amihud et al. (2005) provide an excellent survey on the literature.
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with respect to their patience. In this model, the impatient trader tilts her portfolio
towards the always tradable asset and away from the other asset which is restricted
with respect to trading. As a consequence, the equilibrium price of the restricted asset
is below the price of the unrestricted asset and the discount increases with the length
of the non-trading period.3
In this paper, we propose a new partial equilibrium model to analyze the impact of
non-tradeability on asset prices. In our model, the incentive to trade arises from the
ability of traders to exploit a temporary pricing inefficiency in the stock market. Our
core assumption is that the stock price can deviate temporarily from its fundamen-
tal value—a phenomenon which is well-documented over both short- and long-term
horizons.4 The basic structure of our model is as follows. We model the asset price
as a mean reverting process around the fair asset value which itself follows a random
walk. This modeling captures the idea that the stock price is linked to its fair value,
but might temporarily deviate from it. The investor has an incentive to trade because
trading allows her to exploit the temporary mispricing of the stock. In our model,
there are two assets which differ only with respect to the number of trading dates. The
illiquid stock can be traded only at a fixed trading date whereas the investor can choose
the optimal trading date of the liquid stock. Therefore, the investor is better off when
the asset is liquid, tradeability is valuable, and its value is given by the difference in
the expected trading revenues in the liquid and the illiquid asset, respectively.
Our model delivers four main insights: (1) The higher the pricing efficiency of a
market, the greater the value of tradeability. To clarify the intuition, let us assume that
there is no pricing efficiency at all, i.e. the stock price is not linked to its fundamental
value. Then the investor has no incentive to trade and liquidity has no value. In contrast,
if the pricing efficiency is high, the investor has a strong incentive to trade because
she knows that an observed mispricing will disappear quickly. Therefore, tradeability
is very valuable. (2) The value of tradeability increases with uncertainty, no matter
whether it results from noise trading or from news about the fundamental value. Both,
noise trading in the stock and new information about the fair value increase the proba-
bility of large mispricings in the future which would lead to large profits when trading
the liquid asset. (3) The longer the non-trading period of the illiquid asset, the greater
the value of tradeability. This result is intuitive and consistent with the outcomes of
all models cited above. (4) The value of tradeability increases with the number of
possible trading dates of the liquid asset. This is sensible since a higher number of
trading dates increases the flexibility of the investor holding the liquid stock.
Our paper is organized as follows. In Sect. 2.1 we develop a basic model to calculate
the value of tradeability. In this model, the fair value of the stock is constant and the
liquid stock can only be traded at two possible trading dates. In Sect. 2.2 we extend
this model by allowing the liquid asset to be traded at n possible trading dates. Here
we also solve the model when n goes to infinity, i.e. the liquid asset can be traded
3 This result holds for the baseline calibration of the model, but not for arbitrary parameter combinations.
4 For example, Chordia et al. (2005) analyze the speed of convergence towards efficiency. They find that
stock prices can be predicted up to an hour. Seminal papers on long-term stock price predictability are
DeBondt and Thaler (1985), Fama and French (1988), and Poterba and Summers (1988). See also the
survey of DeBondt and Thaler (1989).
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continuously. In Sect. 2.3 we analyze how information about the fair value influences
the value of tradeability. We conclude in Sect. 3.
2 Pricing tradeability
To calculate the value of tradeability we consider an investor who holds one stock at
time 0.5 The investor searches for the optimal strategy to sell this stock. To keep the
model simple, we do not allow the investor to carry out further trades. However, the
model can be extended in this direction like, for example, in Brennan and Schwartz
(1990) who allow the arbitrage trader to build up and unwind her arbitrage positions
several times before maturity.
The investor has to sell the stock no later than time T . If the stock is illiquid, she
can sell it only at time T . However, she can sell the stock at time τ ≤ T if the stock is
liquid. She will do so if the stock is sufficiently overpriced in τ . Thus, in our model,
the incentive to trade arises from the fact that the stock price S deviates temporarily
from its fair value θ . We assume that the fair value changes randomly over time:
dθt = γ d Bt (1)
(Bt , t  0) is a Brownian motion under the historical probability P and γ deter-
mines the fundamental information flow. The stock price fluctuates around the fair
value according to the following Ornstein–Uhlenbeck process:
d St = k(θt − St )dt + σdWt (2)
Equation (2) shows that the stock price S is pulled towards its fundamental value θ .
The speed of adjustment is characterized by the parameter k which measures the pricing
efficiency of the market. The higher k, the more quickly the stock price moves towards
its fundamental value. σ measures the extent of noise traders. The larger σ , the more
the stock price can temporarily deviate from the fundamental value. The parameters
k and σ are assumed to be positive and constant. (Wt , t  0) is a Brownian motion
under the historical probability P and independent from (Bt , t  0). Equation (2)
implies that there is a non-zero probability that the stock price becomes negative.
However, given the continuity of the price process and the fact that we look at fairly
short non-trading periods, this probability is negligible as shown in “Appendix 1”.
Given this general structure of the model, the investor determines her optimal selling
strategy. The value of tradeability is determined by the difference between the expected
payoff of the optimal trading strategy when the stock is liquid and the expected payoff
of the trading strategy when the stock is illiquid.6
5 Since we focus solely on liquidity in the sense of tradeability, we use the terms liquidity and tradeability
interchangeably throughout the rest of the paper.
6 To keep the exposition of the model simple, we ignore discounting effects. This assumption is reasonable
given that we analyze short non-trading periods. Obviously, discounting terms could be easily added.
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2.1 Basic model
In the basic version of our model we make two additional simplifying assumptions
which allow us to solve the model analytically: (1) The investor can sell the liquid
stock only at times t = 0 or T . (2) The fundamental value of the stock, θ , is constant
over time.
The value of tradeability at time 0 is determined by the difference between the
expected payoffs of the optimal trading strategies when holding a liquid stock and an
illiquid stock, respectively. When holding an illiquid stock, the investor has to sell at
T and the expected payoff is E0(ST ). In contrast, the investor has the flexibility to
sell in 0 or in T when holding a liquid stock. She sells the liquid stock at time 0 if the
stock price at that time is higher than the expected stock price for time T . Thus, the
expected payoff from her optimal trading strategy is
S01S0>E0(ST ) + E0(ST 1S0E0(ST )), (3)
and the value of liquidity is given as:
V L(S0, T ) = (S0 − E0(ST ))1S0>E0(ST ) (4)
Given (2), the expected stock price is:
E0(ST ) = θ − (θ − S0)e−kT (5)
Based on (5) one can easily show that the critical stock price above which the
investor sells the stock is equal to the fundamental value θ :
1S0>E0(ST ) = 1S0>θ (6)
This is a sensible strategy since the investor expects the price to decline if the stock
is currently overpriced, i.e. S0 > θ . Given (5) and (6), the pricing formula (4) can be
written as:
V L(S0, T ) = (1 − e−kT )(S0 − θ)1S0>θ (7)
Equation (7) shows that liquidity can be interpreted as a call on the stock with
strike price θ and instantaneous maturity. The value of liquidity is positive only if
the current stock price (underlying) is above the fair value (strike price), i.e. if the
stock is overpriced. Only in this case is it optimal for the investor to sell the stock at
time 0 making liquidity valuable for the investor. The value of liquidity then increases
linearly in the level of the overpricing, S0 − θ , and the slope, 1 − e−kT , depends on
the pricing efficiency of the market, k, and on the length of the non-trading period of
the illiquid stock, T . Both parameters have a positive and concave impact on the value
of liquidity.
Thus, the simple version of our model predicts that the longer the non-trading
period T of the illiquid stock, the greater the value of liquidity. This is sensible since
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the length of the non-trading period captures the difference in liquidity in our model.
The more the liquid and illiquid assets differ with respect to their tradeability, the more
valuable liquidity is.
Furthermore, (7) implies that the value of liquidity is higher, the more quickly a
temporary mispricing disappears, i.e. the higher the pricing efficiency k of the mar-
ket. The economic intuition is as follows: If the investor holds the liquid stock, she
can exploit the overpricing S0 − θ at time 0. However, the proportion e−kT of this
overpricing is expected to exist until time T and can be exploited by the investor even
when holding the illiquid stock. The value of liquidity is given by the difference in
trading profits: the proportion 1 − e−kT of the current overpricing S0 − θ , i.e., the
overpricing which is not expected to disappear by T . The higher the pricing efficiency
k of the market, the more the overpricing is expected to disappear before the illiquid
stock can be traded and, consequently, the more valuable liquidity is. Equation (7)
highlights the crucial role of our assumption that the stock price is linked to its fair
value. It translates the differences in tradeability (as captured by T ) into differences in
trading profits. Even if the two assets differ dramatically with respect to tradeability,
i.e. T is large, liquidity would have no value for k = 0. In this case, the stock price
would follow a random walk and the investor would not expect to make an additional
profit from selling the liquid asset before T . Thus, liquidity has no value for her.
2.2 Multiple interim trading dates
We now give up the first simplifying assumption and extend our model to several
interim trading dates. This gives the investor more flexibility when selling the liquid
stock and thus increases the difference in tradeability between the liquid and the illiquid
stock. In this setting, the value of liquidity depends not only on the current mispricing
of the stock, but also on the future mispricing. Consequently, the value of liquidity will
now depend on the amount of noise trading, σ , since noise trading makes mispricing
occur in the future.
As a starting point, we allow the investor to sell the liquid stock not only at times
t = 0 and T , but also at time τ = T2 . In this model, the value of liquidity is given as
V L(S0, T ) = E0(1S0>S∗0 (S0 − ST )) + E0(1S0<S∗0 (Sτ 1Sτ >θ + ST 1Sτ θ ) − ST ), (8)
where S∗0 is the critical selling price at time 0 above which the investor sells the stock.
If the stock price is equal to the critical price, the investor is indifferent between selling
the stock at time 0 and waiting to sell the stock later. The expected future selling price
is determined by the expected selling prices at times τ and T . Thus, the critical selling
price at time t = 0 has to satisfy
S∗0 = E0(Sτ 1Sτ >θ | S0 = S∗0 ) + E0(ST 1Sτ θ | S0 = S∗0 ). (9)
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If Sτ is smaller than θ , the expected value of ST is larger than Sτ since the process
of the stock price is mean-reverting. Therefore,
S∗0 > E0(Sτ 1Sτ >θ | S0 = S∗0 ) + E0(Sτ 1Sτ θ | S0 = S∗0 )
> E0(Sτ | S0 = S∗0 ) (10)
which is true if and only if S∗0 > θ . This shows that the critical stock price S∗0 is
above the fair value θ . If the stock price is above its fair value but below the critical
stock price, S∗0 > S0 > θ , the investor does not sell the stock although it is overpriced
and, therefore, expected to decrease. Since there are noise traders in the market, it is
optimal for the investor to wait due to the chance of exploiting a larger overpricing
later. Hence, the time value of the option to sell the stock is strictly positive and it is
not optimal to exercise the option by selling the stock. In “Appendix 2” we show that
the critical stock price S∗0 has to satisfy
S∗0 = e−kt
(
θ − (θ − S∗0 )e−kt
)
+
[
(θ − e−kt (θ − S∗0 ))N (b∗) + e−kt
√ f (t)√
2π
e−(b∗)2/2
]
(1 − e−kt )
+θ(1 − e−kt )N (−b∗)
= e−kt
(
θ − (θ − S∗0 )e−kt
)
+
[
θ − e−kt (θ − S∗0 )N (b∗) + e−kt
√ f (t)√
2π
e−(b∗)2/2
]
(1 − e−kt ) (11)
with t being the time between two possible trading dates of the liquid stock and
b∗ = (S∗0 − θ)/
√
f (t) (12)
f (t) = σ
2
2k
(e2kt − 1). (13)
As shown in “Appendix 3”, the value of liquidity can be written as follows:
V L(S0, T ) = 1S0>S∗0 (1 − e−kT )(S0 − θ)
+1S0<S∗0 (1 − e−kt )
(
e−kt (S0 − θ)N (b) + e
−kt
√
2π
√
f (t)e−b2/2
)
(14)
The value of liquidity is determined by the additional profit of the investor given
that it is optimal to sell at time 0 [first line of Eq. (14)] or to sell at time τ [second line
of Eq. (14)]. If it is optimal to sell at time 0, the investor makes the same profit as in
the basic model. However, if S0 < S∗0 , the investor is better off by selling the stock
not at time 0, but by waiting until time τ or T .
Figure 1 shows the value of liquidity in the model with two interim trading dates.
The figure is based on the following parameters: The non-trading period is 1 day,
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Fig. 1 Impact of stock price, pricing efficiency, length of the non-trading period, and stock price volatility
on the value of liquidity. The figures show the value of liquidity for varying values of S0 (upper left figure),
k (upper right figure), T (bottom left figure), and σ (bottom right figure) when the liquid stock can be traded
at times 0, τ , or T . The fair value of the stock is constant and chosen as θ = 100. In the upper left figure,
the pricing efficiency is k = 200, the non-trading period of the illiquid stock is 1 day, i.e. T = 1/365, and
the volatility is σ = 30. In all remaining figures we analyze the cases of S0 = 102 (dotted line), S0 = 100
(dashed line), and S0 = 98 (solid line). The remaining model parameters are chosen as follows: in the
upper right figure, the non-trading period of the illiquid stock is 1 day, i.e. T = 1/365 and the volatility
is σ = 30. In the bottom left figure, the pricing efficiency is k = 200 and the volatility is σ = 30. In the
bottom right figure the pricing efficiency is k = 200 and the non-trading period of the illiquid stock is 1 day,
i.e. T = 1/365
i.e. T = 1/365. The mean reversion parameter is k = 200 which implies that the
half-life of the mispricing is 1.26 days. The noise trading parameter is σ = 30 which
corresponds to a stock volatility of about 30%. The upper two figures show how
the value of liquidity depends on the stock price S0 and on the pricing efficiency k,
respectively. The bottom figures show the impact of the length of the non-trading
period (measured in days) and the volatility of the stock price on the value of liquidity,
respectively.
The value of liquidity shows the same characteristics as in the basic model. It
increases with the stock price S0 (for a given fair value), with the pricing efficiency
k of the market, and with the length T of the non-trading period of the illiquid stock.
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The impact of k and T on the value of liquidity is positive and concave, no matter
whether the stock is currently overpriced, fairly priced, or underpriced.
In the basic model, the investor could sell the liquid stock early only at time 0, i.e.
her option to sell early expires at time 0 and, consequently, the option value does only
depend on the mispricing at this time, but not on the future mispricing. Therefore,
noise trading which makes future mispricing occur does not matter and σ does not
influence the option price. In the extended model, the option to sell the liquid stock
early expires at time τ and, therefore, future mispricing and stock price volatility σ
matter for the value of the option. As shown in the bottom right figure, the value of
liquidity increases with stock price volatility. Evidently, the relation is strongest when
the stock is currently fair priced. In this case, the investor benefits most from noise
trading due to the asymmetric nature of the option. The value of liquidity rises linearly
with volatility from almost zero to approximately 0.2%.
We now generalize the model by allowing the investor to sell the stock at times
0,t, . . ., nt = T and denote the stock price at time (n − i)t as Sn−i . By gen-
eralizing Eqs. (45)–(47) in “Appendix 3”, the value of liquidity can be calculated
as
V Ln(S0, T ) = 1S0>S∗0 (1 − e−kT )(S0 − θ) + 1S0<S∗0 (1 − e−k(T −t))E0((S1 − θ)1S1>S∗1 )
+(1 − e−k(T −2t))E0((S2 − θ)1S1<S∗1 1S2>S∗2 )
+· · · + (1 − e−k(T −it))E0((Si − θ)1S1<S∗1 . . .1Si−1<S∗i−1 1Si >S∗i ) + · · ·
+(1 − e−k(T −(n−1)t))E0((Sn−1 − θ)1S1<S∗1 . . .1Sn−2<S∗n−2 1Sn−1>θ )
(15)
where the critical levels are computed recursively. The critical value at the last interim
trading date is given by the fundamental value of the stock
S∗n−1 = θ (16)
and S∗n−2 is the smallest x such that:
x = En−2(Sn−11Sn−1>θ | Sn−2 = x) + En−2(ST 1Sn−1θ | Sn−2 = x) (17)
More generally, S∗n−i has to satisfy:
x = En−i (Sn−i+11Sn−i+1>S∗n−i+1 | Sn−i = x) (18)
+En−i (Sn−i+21Sn−i+1<S∗n−i+11Sn−i+2>S∗n−i+2 | Sn−i = x) + · · ·
+En−i (Sn1Sn−i+1<S∗n−i+1 1Sn−i+2<S∗n−i+2 . . .1Sn−1<θ | Sn−i = x)
To solve the valuation problem, we first compute critical stock prices recursively
using Eq. (18). Then we calculate the expectations on the right-hand side of Eq. (15).
This delivers the value of liquidity for n trading dates.
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When the investor can trade continuously, i.e. the number of interim trading dates
tends toward infinity, generalizing Eq. (15) leads to
V L(S0, T ) = lim
n→+∞ V Ln(S0, T ) = supτ∈ E0((1 − e
−k(T −τ))(Sτ − θ)) (19)
where  is the set of stopping times with values in [0, T ]. The value of liquidity can
now be calculated as the price of an American option and we have to solve a free
boundary problem. In general, there is no exact analytical solution for pricing Amer-
ican options. Instead, one can use the solution (15)–(18) of the discrete version of the
model and calculate the value of liquidity for a sufficiently high number of trading
dates. Alternatively, one can search for an analytical approximation of the solution
of the continuous version of the model. We follow the second path since it delivers
closed form results which can be economically interpreted. The value of liquidity can
be approximated as follows:
V L(S0, T )  sup
C
T∫
0
(1 − e−k(T −t))(K (t) − θ)p(Tk ∈ dt) (20)
As shown in “Appendix 4”, the density of the first passage time Tk of the Ornstein–
Uhlenbeck process S at the boundary K (·) is
p(Tk ∈ dt) = e2ktσ 2 |C − S0|√
2π f (t)3
e
− (C−S0+α f (t))22 f (t) dt (21)
with
f (t) = σ
2
2k
(e2kt − 1) (22)
α = 2k(θ − C)
σ 2(e2kT − 1) (23)
K (t) = e−kt (C − θ)
(
1 − e
2kt − 1
e2kT − 1
)
+ θ (24)
where C is a free parameter.
The structure of the pricing formula is very similar to the structure of the pricing
formula in our earlier models. The value of liquidity is equal to the value of an Ameri-
can call option with a payoff equal to (1−e−k(T −τ))(K (τ )−θ) at the optimal exercise
time τ , i.e. when exercised at the first passage time of the process S at the boundary K .
As shown in Fig. 2, the value of liquidity depends on S0, k, T , and σ in the same
way as in the earlier models: It increases in the overpricing of the stock, in the pricing
efficiency of the market, in the length of the non-trading period of the illiquid stock,
and in the amount of noise trading.
In Fig. 3 we show how the value of liquidity depends on the number of interim
trading dates. We plot the value of liquidity for varying S0 for the basic model (trading
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Fig. 2 Impact of stock price, pricing efficiency, length of the non-trading period, and stock price volatility
on the value of liquidity. The figures show the value of liquidity for varying values of S0 (upper left figure),
k (upper right figure), T (bottom left figure), and σ when the liquid stock can be traded continuously. The
fair value of the stock is constant and chosen as θ = 100. In the upper left figure, the pricing efficiency is
k = 200, the non-trading period of the illiquid stock is 1 day, i.e. T = 1/365, and the volatility is σ = 30.
In all remaining figures we analyze the cases of S0 = 102 (dotted line), S0 = 100 (dashed line), and
S0 = 98 (solid line). The remaining model parameters are chosen as follows: In the upper right figure, the
non-trading period of the illiquid stock is 1 day, i.e. T = 1/365 and the volatility is σ = 30. In the bottom
left figure, the pricing efficiency is k = 200 and the volatility is σ = 30. In the bottom right figure the
pricing efficiency is k = 200 and the non-trading period of the illiquid stock is 1 day, i.e. T = 1/365
at times 0 and T ), the model with trading at times 0, τ = T2 , and T , the model with
fifteen interim dates and the model with continuous trading of the liquid stock.
Figure 3 clearly shows that the value of liquidity increases with the number of
trading dates. This is sensible since a larger number of trading dates results in higher
trading flexibility of the liquid stock. This effect is most pronounced when the stock
is currently fairly priced, i.e. S0 = θ = 100. In this case the investor benefits most
from the increased flexibility. The figure also shows that the value of liquidity con-
verges to (20) when the number of interim trading dates increases. In Fig. 3 one can
hardly see any difference between the value of liquidity with fifteen interim trading
dates and the value of liquidity with continuous trading. For S0 = θ = 100, the
value of liquidity is 0.1454 in the first case, and 0.1482 in the second case. Thus, the
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Fig. 3 Impact of the stock price on the value of liquidity as a function of the number of interim trading
dates. The figure shows the value of liquidity for varying values of S0 in four cases. (1) The liquid stock
can be traded at times 0 and T (solid line). (2) The liquid stock can be traded at times 0, τ = T/2, and T
(dashed line). (3) The liquid stock can be traded at fifteen interim trading dates (dashed dotted line). (4)
The liquid stock can be traded continuously (dotted line). The fair value of the stock is constant and chosen
as θ = 100. The pricing efficiency is k = 200, the non-trading period of the illiquid stock is 1 day, i.e.
T = 1/365, and the volatility is σ = 30
difference is only −0.0028 which is about −2% of the value of liquidity. For 100
interim trading dates (not shown in Fig. 3), the difference is even smaller and amounts
to only −0.0005 which equals about −0.29%. Thus, our analytical approximation
of the continuous model and the numerical solution of the discrete model converge
well for a high number of trading dates highlighting the accuracy of the analytical
approximation (20)–(24).
2.3 Random fundamental value
We now give up the assumption that the fundamental value θ of the stock is constant
and develop our full model. The fair value evolves according to Eq. (1) and the stock
price according to Eq. (2). The investor can sell the liquid stock at any time 0 ≤ τ ≤ T ,
but the illiquid stock only at T . In this model, the dynamics of the stock price can be
written as:
d St = k(θ0 + γ Bt − St )dt + σdWt (25)
Obviously, the stock price S evolves no longer according to an Ornstein–Uhlenbeck
process. Therefore, we define a modified stock price
Sˆt = St − γ Bt (26)
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which is the stock price corrected for the impact of the innovations of the fair value.
The modified stock price follows again an Ornstein–Uhlenbeck process with a constant
fundamental value θ0 and a volatility
√
σ 2 + γ 2:
d Sˆt = k(θ0 − Sˆt )dt + σdWt − γ d Bt (27)
To solve the model as in the previous section, we characterize the optimal exer-
cise boundary in this new setting. In “Appendix 5” we show that the optimal exercise
boundary S∗ of the process S is given by the sum of the boundary Sˆ∗ of the Ornstein–
Uhlenbeck process Sˆ and γ Bt :
S∗t = Sˆ∗t + γ Bt (28)
Therefore, the optimal exercise boundary can be approximated by the sum of γ Bt
and the function K (t) given in Eq. (24). In Sect. 2.2 we showed that K (t) is an accurate
approximation for a given volatility σ . Since the volatility is now
√
σ 2 + γ 2, we need
to check whether the approximation remains accurate for larger values of volatility.
To do so, we calculate the difference in the value of liquidity between the discrete
model with 100 interim trading dates and our analytical approximation for volatility
levels between σ = 10 and σ = 100. When the stock price and the fundamental
value are both 100 as before, the difference (−0.29%) between the model value and
the approximation value is the same (up to an accuracy level of 10−10) for all levels
of volatility. This suggests that the quality of our analytical approximation does not
depend on the volatility of the stock price, i.e. it is the same in Sects. 2.2 and 2.3.
Consequently, we can calculate the value of liquidity as in Eqs. (20)–(24), but now
based on the new Ornstein–Uhlenbeck process {Sˆt ; t ≥ 0}.
This suggests that allowing the fair value to change randomly does not change our
earlier result qualitatively. Using a fair value that is random leads to an increase in
volatility (
√
σ 2 + γ 2 instead of σ ) and, consequently, to an increase in the value of
liquidity. Thus, we get the final prediction of our model: The more information about
the fair value flows into the market, the more valuable liquidity is. Thus, uncertainty
increases the value of liquidity, no matter whether it results from noise trading or from
fundamental news.
3 Conclusions
Tradeability of assets is crucial for investors. If is it lacking, investors might encounter
serious difficulties in their risk management as seen during the recent financial crisis.
Yet, even in more modest financial situations, tradeability is important for investors
since it allows them to adjust their portfolio when needed. Trading needs make trade-
ability valuable.
In this paper, we determine the value of tradeability using an option pricing
approach. In our model, tradeability is valuable since it allows the investor to exploit
temporary mispricing of stocks. We assume that the stock price is linked to its fair
value, but may temporarily deviate from it. The liquid asset allows the investor to
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exploit the mispricings, the illiquid one does not. The larger this mispricing, the more
valuable tradeability is. The second main factor driving the value of tradeability is the
difference in liquidity between the liquid and the illiquid stock. The longer the illiquid
stock cannot be traded and the more trading dates the liquid stock offers, the more
valuable tradeability is. However, differences in liquidity translate only to a positive
value of tradeability if the mispricing is expected to disappear over time. Otherwise,
the investor cannot predict future price changes and, therefore, cannot expect to make
a higher trading profit when holding the liquid stock. Hence, our model predicts that
the value of tradeability increases with the strength of the pricing efficiency of the
market. The more quickly a mispricing disappears, the higher the incentive to trade,
and the higher the value of tradeability. Finally, we show that the value of tradeability
increases with uncertainty, no matter whether the uncertainty results from noise trad-
ing or from news about the fundamental value. Both effects increase the probability
of large temporary mispricings in the future and, thus, the value of liquidity.
In our view, the most striking result of our model is that the value of tradeability is
especially high in markets with high pricing efficiency and strong information flow.
Testing these predictions of our model empirically is an interesting avenue of further
research.
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Appendix 1
We first assume that the fair value of the stock is positive and constant, i.e. θ > 0. Let
us define the following stopping time
T ′k = inf{t ≥ 0; S < K (t)}, (29)
where the function K (·) (see also “Appendix 4”) is given by
K (t) = (α f (t) + β + S0 − θ) e−kt + θ. (30)
with f (t) = σ 22k (e2kt − 1). The function K (·) is close to zero and positive. The two
parameters α and β which characterize this function are defined as follows:
K (0) = β + S0 = C = 10−4 (31)
K (T ) = (α f (T ) + C − θ) e−kT + θ = C = 10−4 (32)
Therefore
α = θ − Cf (T ) (1 − e
kT ). (33)
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It can be easily shown that the function K (·) is positive on [0, T ]:
K (t) =
(
θ − C
f (T ) (1 − e
kT ) f (t) + C − θ
)
e−kt + θ (34)
From the definition of the function f (·) it follows that
K (t) = (θ − C)
(
1 − e2kt
ekT + 1 − 1
)
e−kt + θ (35)
and
K (t) = (θ − C)
(−(ekT + e2kt )e−kt + ekT + 1
ekT + 1
)
+ C. (36)
The numerator of this ratio is positive on [0, T ].
Let us now define the first passage time of the process S at level 0:
T0 = inf {t ≥ 0; St < 0} (37)
Since the function K (·) is positive, it follows:
p(T0 < T ) < p(T ′k < T ) =
T∫
0
p(T ′k ∈ dt) (38)
From Eq. (21) the density is obtained:
p(T ′k ∈ dt) = e2ktσ 2
|C − S0|√
2π f (t)3
e
− (C−S0+α f (t))22 f (t) dt (39)
where α is given by Eq. (32).
With our set of parameters (θ = 100, S0 = 100, σ = 30, k = 200, C = 10−4), the
resulting probability is smaller than 10−100 even for a non-trading period of one year.
Thus, the probability of reaching a negative stock price is negligible.
We now turn to the case that the fundamental value of the stock is stochastic with
θ0 > 0. In Sect. 2.3 we show that this case is equivalent to the case of a constant
fundamental value with an increased volatility (
√
σ 2 + γ 2 instead of σ ). Assuming
reasonable values for the volatility of the fundamental value (e.g. γ = 30) the prob-
ability of reaching a negative stock price is still negligible. Even for an non-trading
period of one year it is smaller than 10−100.
Appendix 2
To solve Eq. (9) for the critical stock price, we have to calculate the expected profit of
the investor when she decides not to sell at time 0. This is given by the expected stock
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price at time τ given she sells in τ (first term on the right hand side of Eq. (9)) plus the
expected stock price in T given she waits until T (second term on the right hand side
of Eq. (9)). We now calculate the first term on the right hand side of Eq. (9). Given
the dynamics of the stock price in Eq. (2), the probability of Sτ being larger than the
fair value θ is
p(Sτ > θ) = p(θ − e−kt (θ − S0 − Z f (t)) > θ) (40)
with f (t) = σ 22k (e2kt −1). {Z f (t), t ≥ 0} is a time-changed Brownian motion. Rewrit-
ing yields
p(Sτ > θ) = p
(
− Z f (t)√ f (t) ≤
(S0 − θ)√ f (t)
)
= N (b) (41)
with b = (S0 − θ)/√ f (t) and N being the cumulative density of a standard normal
variable. Therefore, the expected stock price conditional on being above the fair value
is
E0(Sτ 1Sτ >θ ) = E0
(
(θ − e−kt (θ − S0 − Z f (t)))1(− Z f (t)√ f (t) ≤b
)
)
= (θ − e−kt (θ − S0))N (b) + e−kt
√
f (t)E0
(
Z f (t)√ f (t)1(− Z f (t)√ f (t) ≤b)
)
= (θ − e−kt (θ − S0))N (b) − e
−kt√ f (t)
√
2π
b∫
−∞
xe−
x2
2 dx
= (θ − e−kt (θ − S0))N (b) + e
−kt√ f (t)
√
2π
e−
b2
2 . (42)
We now turn to the second term on the right hand side of Eq. (9).
E0(ST 1Sτ θ ) = E0(1Sτ θ (θ − (θ − Sτ )e−kt ))
= e−kt E(1Sτ θ Sτ ) + θ(1 − e−kt )p(Sτ < θ) (43)
Putting (43) into (9) and rearranging the terms yields
S∗0 = e−kt E(Sτ | S0 = S∗0 ) + (1 − e−kt )E(1Sτ >θ Sτ | S0 = S∗0 )
+θ(1 − e−kt )p(Sτ < θ | S0 = S∗0 ) (44)
We use (5) for the calculation of the first term, (42) for the second term, and (41) for
the final term of (44). This gives us Eq. (11).
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Appendix 3
Equation (8) can be written as
V L(S0, T ) = 1S0≥S∗0 E0(S0 − ST ) + 1S0<S∗0 E0((Sτ − ST )1Sτ >θ ). (45)
Given the dynamics of the stock price, the first expectation on the right hand side is
E0(S0 − ST ) = (1 − e−kT )(S0 − θ). (46)
The second expectation is
E0
(
Eτ
(
(Sτ − ST )1Sτ >θ
) ) = E0
((
Sτ − (θ − e−kt (θ − Sτ − (Z f (T ) − Z f (τ ))))1Sτ >θ
))
= E0
(
(Sτ − θ)(1 − e−kt )1Sτ >θ
)
(47)
and by relying on “Appendix 2” we get
E0
(
Eτ
(
(Sτ − ST )1Sτ >θ
) ) = −θ(1 − e−kt )N (b)
+(1 − e−kt )
(
(θ − e−kt (θ − S0))N (b) + e
−kt√ f (t)√
2π
e−b2/2
)
= (1 − e−kt )
(
e−kt (S0 − θ)N (b) + e
−kt√ f (t)√
2π
e−b2/2
)
(48)
with f (t) = σ 22k (e2kt −1) and {Z f (t), t ≥ 0} being a time-changed Brownian motion.
This leads to Eq. (14).
Appendix 4
The stochastic differential (2) has the solution
St = θ − e−kt (θ − S0 − Z f (t)), (49)
with f (t) = σ 22k (e2kt − 1) and {Z f (t), t ≥ 0} being a time changed Brownian motion.
We define the stopping time
Tk = inf{t ≥ 0; St ≥ K (t)}, (50)
where K (t) is an exercise boundary. Using (49) the stopping time can be written as:
Tk = inf{t ≥ 0; θ − e−kt (θ − S0 − Z f (t)) ≥ K (t)},
= inf{t ≥ 0; θ − S0 − Z f (t) ≤ (θ − K (t))ekt }
= inf{t ≥ 0; Z f (t) ≥ (K (t) − θ)ekt + θ − S0} (51)
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Let us now assume that the boundary K (·) satisfies
(K (t) − θ)ekt + θ − S0 = α f (t) + β (52)
where α and β are two parameters. (52) implies
K (t) = (α f (t) + β + S0 − θ) e−kt + θ. (53)
This assumption allows us to derive analytically the density p(Tk ∈ dt) of the first
passage time of the Ornstein–Uhlenbeck process S at this boundary. Using (52) the
stopping time (51) can be written as
Tk = inf
{
t ≥ 0; Z f (t) ≥ α f (t) + β
} (54)
with the boundary condition K (T ) = θ . Applying this boundary condition to (53)
yields
α = θ − S0 − βf (T ) (55)
= 2k(θ − C)
σ 2(e2kT − 1) (56)
with C = S0 + β. Using (56), the boundary (53) can be written as:
K (t) =
(
2k(θ − C)
σ 2(e2kT − 1)
σ 2(e2kt − 1)
2k
+ C − θ
)
e−kt + θ (57)
which leads to Eq. (24) of the main text. The density of Tk can be written as
p(Tk ∈ dt) = dp(Tk ≤ t)dt
= dp( f (Tk) ≤ f (t))
dt
= d f (t)
dt
dp( f (Tk) ≤ f (t))
d f (t) (58)
because d f (t)dt is positive. Therefore
p(Tk ∈ dt) = d f (t)dt g( f (t))dt, (59)
where g is the density of the first passage time of a drifted Brownian motion {Zt −αt,
t ≥ 0} at level β. This leads to Eq. (21).
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Appendix 5
In this appendix we prove Eq. (28) of the main text. The discrete time version of this
equation is
S∗n−i = Sˆ∗n−i + γ Bn−i , i ∈ {1, 2, . . ., n} (60)
where S∗n−i and Sˆ∗n−i are the exercise boundaries for the price processes S and Sˆ and
Bn−i the Brownian motion at time (n − i)t , respectively. n is defined by nt = T .
We proceed recursively when proving (60).
For i = 1, the proof is straightforward. At the last interim trading date, (n−1)t =
T −t , the stock will be sold if and only if its value exceeds the current fundamental
value θ0 + γ Bn−1. Therefore, the optimal exercise boundary is given as
S∗n−1 = θ0 + γ Bn−1. (61)
According to Eq. (16), θ0 is the exercise boundary at the last interim trading date
if the fundamental value takes a constant value θ0 (as it is the case for Sˆ according to
Eq. (27)). Thus, Eq. (60) holds for i = 1.
For i = 2, the exercise boundary S∗n−2 is characterized by the equality between the
profit if the stock is sold instantaneously and the expected profit if the stock is sold
later. Therefore, S∗n−2 satisfies the following equation:
x = En−2(Sn−11Sn−1>S∗n−1 | Sn−2 = x) + En−2(Sn1Sn−1S∗n−1 | Sn−2 = x)
This general characterization of an exercise boundary holds true whatever the
dynamics of the fundamental value is, i.e. it holds for a constant fundamental value as
well as for a stochastic one. Since the exercise boundary S∗n−1 is given by (61), S∗n−2
satisfies
x = En−2(Sn−11Sn−1>θ0+γ Bn−1 | Sn−2 = x) + En−2(Sn1Sn−1θ0+γ Bn−1 | Sn−2 = x).
Expanding this equation leads to
x = En−2((Sn−1 − γ Bn−1)1Sn−1−γ Bn−1>θ0 | Sn−2 = x)
+En−2((Sn − γ Bn)1S
n−1−γ Bn−1θ0 | Sn−2 = x)
+γ En−2((Bn − Bn−1)1S
n−1−γ Bn−1θ0 | Sn−2 = x)
+γ En−2((Bn−1 − Bn−2) | Sn−2 = x) + γ Bn−2
The last two expectations are zero since the increments of the Brownian motion are
normally distributed with mean zero:
γ En−2((Bn − Bn−1)1S
n−1 −γ Bn−1θ0 | Sn−2 = x) + γ En−2((Bn−1 − Bn−2) | Sn−2 = x)
= γ En−2(1S
n−1 −γ Bn−1θ0 En−1(Bn − Bn−1) | Sn−2 = x) + γ En−2((Bn−1 − Bn−2) | Sn−2 = x)
= 0
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Using the definition (26) of the process Sˆ we can rewrite the optimal boundary con-
dition as
S∗n−2 = En−2(Sˆn−11Sˆn−1>θ0 | Sˆn−2 = S∗n−2 − γ Bn−2)
+En−2(Sˆn1Sˆn−1θ0 | Sˆn−2 = S∗n−2 − γ Bn−2) + γ Bn−2 (62)
If
Sˆn−2 = S∗n−2 − γ Bn−2 < Sˆ∗n−2, (63)
it is optimal to wait before selling the stock with price Sˆ and dynamics given by
Eq. (27). This implies
En−2(Sˆn−11Sˆn−1>θ0 | Sˆn−2 = S∗n−2 − γ Bn−2)
+En−2(Sˆn1Sˆn−1θ0 | Sˆn−2 = S∗n−2 − γ Bn−2) > Sˆn−2
and given Eq. (62):
S∗n−2 − γ Bn−2 > Sˆn−2 (64)
Equations (63) and (64) are incompatible, i.e. Sˆn−2 cannot be strictly smaller than
Sˆ∗n−2 − γ Bn−2.
Conversely if
Sˆn−2 = S∗n−2 − γ Bn−2 > Sˆ∗n−2, (65)
it is optimal not to wait, but to sell the stock with price Sˆ and dynamics given by
Eq. (27). This implies
En−2(Sˆn−11Sˆn−1>θ0 | Sˆn−2 = S∗n−2 − γ Bn−2)
+En−2(Sˆn1Sˆn−1θ0 | Sˆn−2 = S∗n−2 − γ Bn−2) < Sˆn−2.
and given Eq. (62):
S∗n−2 − γ Bn−2 < Sˆn−2 (66)
Equations (65) and (66) are incompatible, i.e. Sˆn−2 cannot be strictly larger than
Sˆ∗n−2−γ Bn−2. Since Sˆn−2 can neither be strictly smaller nor larger than Sˆ∗n−2−γ Bn−2,
we have proved
S∗n−2 − γ Bn−2 = Sˆ∗n−2. (67)
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We now turn to the general case and prove that for any i in {1, 2, . . ., n − 1}
S∗n−i−1 = Sˆ∗n−i−1 + γ Bn−i−1 (68)
if the following conditions are satisfied:
S∗n− j = Sˆ∗n− j + γ Bn− j , j ∈ {1, i} (69)
We proceed along the same lines as above. According to Eq. (18), S∗n−i−1 satisfies
x = En−i−1(Sn−i 1Sn−i >S∗n−i | Sn−i−1 = x)
+En−i−1(Sn−i+11Sn−i <S∗n−i 1Sn−i+1>S∗n−i+1 | Sn−i−1 = x) + · · ·
+En−i−1(Sn1Sn−i <S∗n−i 1Sn−i+1<S∗n−i+1 . . .1Sn−1<S∗n−1 | Sn−i−1 = x)
Given (69) we can rewrite this equation as
x = En−i−1(Sn−i 1Sn−i >Sˆ∗n−i +γ Bn−i | Sn−i−1 = x) (70)
+En−i−1(Sn−i+11Sn−i <Sˆ∗n−i +γ Bn−i 1Sn−i+1>Sˆ∗n−i+1+γ Bn−i+1 | Sn−i−1 = x) + · · ·
+En−i−1(Sn1Sn−i <Sˆ∗n−i +γ B∗n−i 1Sn−i+1<Sˆ∗n−i+1+γ Bn−i+1 . . .1Sn−1<θ0+γ Bn−1 | Sn−i−1 = x)
and expand it to
S∗n−i−1 = En−i−1((Sn−i − γ Bn−i )1Sn−i −γ Bn−i >Sˆ∗n−i | Sˆn−i−1 = S
∗
n−i−1 − γ Bn−i−1)
+En−i−1((Sn−i+1 − γ Bn−i+1)1Sn−i −γ Bn−i <Sˆ∗n−i 1Sn−i+1−γ Bn−i+1>Sˆ∗n−i+1
| Sˆn−i−1 = S∗n−i−1 − γ Bn−i−1) + · · ·
+En−i−1((Sn − γ Bn)1Sn−i −γ Bn−i <Sˆ∗n−i 1Sn−i+1−γ Bn−i+1<Sˆ∗n−i+1 . . .
1Sn−1−γ Bn−1<θ0 | Sˆn−i−1 = S∗n−i−1 − γ Bn−i−1)
+γ En−i−1((Bn − Bn−1)1Sn−i −γ Bn−i <Sˆ∗n−i 1Sn−i+1−γ Bn−i+1<Sˆ∗n−i+1 . . .
1Sn−1−γ Bn−1<θ0 | Sˆn−i−1 = S∗n−i−1 − γ Bn−i−1)
+γ En−i−1((Bn−1 − Bn−2)1Sn−i −γ Bn−i <Sˆ∗n−i 1Sn−i+1−γ Bn−i+1<Sˆ∗n−i+1 . . .
1Sn−2−γ Bn−2<θ0 | Sˆn−i−1 = S∗n−i−1 − γ Bn−i−1) + · · ·
+γ En−i−1((Bn−i − Bn−i−1) | Sˆn−i−1 = S∗n−i−1 − γ Bn−i−1)
+γ Bn−i−1. (71)
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Since the increments of the Brownian motion are normally distributed with a mean
equal to zero, according to the law of iterative expections the equation simplifies to
S∗n−i−1 = En−i−1((Sn−i −γ Bn−i )1Sn−i −γ Bn−i >Sˆ∗n−i | Sˆn−i−1 = S
∗
n−i−1 − γ Bn−i−1)
En−i−1((Sn−i+1 − γ Bn−i+1)1Sn−i −γ Bn−i <Sˆ∗n−i 1Sn−i+1−γ Bn−i+1>Sˆ∗n−i+1
| Sˆn−i−1 = S∗n−i−1) − γ Bn−i−1 + · · ·
+En−i−1((Sn − γ Bn)1Sn−i −γ Bn−i <Sˆ∗n−i 1Sn−i+1−γ Bn−i+1<Sˆ∗n−i+1 . . .
1Sn−1−γ Bn−1<θ0 | Sˆn−i−1 = S∗n−i−1 − γ Bn−i−1)
+γ Bn−i−1. (72)
If
Sˆn−i−1 = S∗n−i−1 − γ Bn−i−1 < Sˆ∗n−i−1, (73)
it is optimal to wait before selling the stock with price Sˆ and dynamics given by
Eq. (27). This implies
En−i−1((Sn−i − γ Bn−i )1Sn−i −γ Bn−i >Sˆ∗n−i | Sˆn−i−1 = S
∗
n−i−1 − γ Bn−i−1)
En−i−1((Sn−i+1 − γ Bn−(n−i+1))1Sn−i −γ Bn−i <Sˆ∗n−i 1Sn−i+1−γ Bn−i+1>Sˆ∗n−i+1
| Sˆn−i−1 = S∗n−i−1 − γ Bn−i−1) + · · ·
+En−i−1((Sn − γ Bn)1Sn−i −γ Bn−i <Sˆ∗n−i 1Sn−i+1−γ Bn−i+1<Sˆ∗n−i+1 . . .
1Sn−1−γ Bn−1<θ0 | Sˆn−i−1 = S∗n−i−1 − γ Bn−i−1)
> Sˆn−i−1 (74)
which leads in combination with Eq. (72) to
S∗n−i−1 − γ Bn−i−1 > Sˆn−i−1. (75)
Equations (73) and (75) are incompatible, i.e. Sˆn−i−1 cannot be smaller than Sˆ∗n−i−1.
Conversely if
Sˆn−i−1 = S∗n−i−1 − γ Bn−i−1 > Sˆ∗n−i−1, (76)
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it is optimal not to wait, but to sell the stock. This implies
En−i−1((Sn−i − γ Bn−i )1Sn−i −γ Bn−i >Sˆ∗n−i | Sˆn−i−1 = S
∗
n−i−1 − γ Bn−i−1)
En−i−1((Sn−i+1 − γ Bn−i+1)1Sn−i −γ Bn−i <Sˆ∗n−i 1Sn−i+1−γ Bn−i+1>Sˆ∗n−i+1
| Sˆn−i−1 = S∗n−i−1 − γ Bn−i−1) + · · ·
+En−i−1((Sn − γ Bn)1Sn−i −γ Bn−i <Sˆ∗n−i 1Sn−i+1−γ Bn−i+1<Sˆ∗n−i+1 . . .
1Sn−1−γ Bn−1<θ0 | Sˆn−i−1 = S∗n−i−1 − γ Bn−i−1)
< Sˆn−i−1 (77)
which leads in combination with Eq. (72) to
S∗n−i−1 − γ Bn−i−1 < Sˆn−i−1. (78)
Equations (76) and (78) are incompatible, i.e. Sˆn−i−1 cannot be larger than Sˆ∗n−i−1.
Since Sˆn−i−1 can also not be smaller than Sˆ∗n−i−1, Eq. (60) is proved.
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